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The latest issue of China Perspectivesfocuses on the topic of “Gao 
Xingjian and the Role of Chinese Literature Today.” Below appears a slightly modified version of the 
issue’s editorial essay, written by journal editor Sebastian Veg. It is posted here with permission 
By Sebastian Veg 
Chinese literature and its significance or insignificance is a continued subject of heated debate in 
China. From May Fourth, when anti-traditionalist thinkers called on literature to assume a pioneering 
role in transforming subjects into citizens, to its use as propaganda during World War Two and on both 
sides of the Strait after 1949, it was seen as a crucial vector of political ideas. During the 
“Enlightenment” of the 1980s, literature was again called upon to play a central – though politically 
very different – role in helping society come to terms with the officially still taboo traumas of the 
Cultural Revolution. However, “Enlightenment” this time was not only synonymous with anti-
traditionalism: critical reflection on the iconoclasm of the Cultural Revolution, emphasizing literature’s 
role as a moral conscience, also led to an enthusiastic rediscovery of cultural tradition, often against 
May Fourth ideals, among the writers of the “roots” (xungen) movement. It was only in the aftermath 
of the failed Tiananmen protests of 1989 that younger writers began to substantially question the 
need for literature to play a central role in society and in intellectual debate. 
Perhaps inevitably, while its significant social role was extolled, debates about Chinese literature were 
routinely accompanied by anguished doubts about its intrinsic, aesthetic, or intellectual value, whether 
because of its alleged break (voluntary or as the result of an irresistible historical trend) with Chinese 
tradition or, on the contrary, because of its continued subordination of aesthetic autonomy – viewed 
as a defining aspect of the “high modernism” that ensures writers international recognition – to socio-
political concerns. Soul-searching about why Chinese writers did or did not deserve a Nobel Prize for 
Literature took place throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, with official organs such as the 
Writers’ Association actively lobbying on behalf of members such as Ba Jin and Ai Qing. Liu Xiaobo on 
the other hand, then the “angry young man” of Chinese literary criticism, in a talk at the literature 
Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (chaired by Liu Zaifu) in 1986 and 
several subsequent articles attacking “scar literature” and the roots writers, also called for an end to 
Chinese writers’ “childish” obsession with the Nobel Prize. [1] 
 
Liu Zaifu, in a series of articles written on the eve of the hundredth anniversary of the literature prize, 
underscored the long history and great value of Chinese literature and unabashedly called for 
international institutional recognition of its qualities before the count of prizes reached one 
hundred. [2] Writing about his visit to Sweden at the invitation of Göran Malmqvist, Liu discusses the 
merits of Lu Xun, Li Jieren, and Shen Congwen before going on to mention contemporary authors Bei 
Dao, Gao Xingjian, and Li Rui as favourites of Malmqvist. The Swedish academy’s choice of Gao 
Xingjian the very next year as the laureate of the one hundredth anniversary prize appeared to many 
as a carefully balanced rejoinder to these criticisms: while awarding the prize to a culturally and 
linguistically Chinese writer who, although he had lived in China for almost 50 years and written 
largely within the context of contemporary Chinese literature, now held French citizenship and also 
wrote in French, the Nobel committee seemed to be explicitly rejecting, just as Gao had in his own 
essays, the idea that the Nobel prize should be “representative” in any way of a nation-state or its 
literary field. At first, there seems to have been significant tension within the Chinese literary-political 
establishment as to how to react to the Nobel Prize (announced on 12 October 2000): the nominal 
president of the writers’ association was still Ba Jin, who at 96 and in ill health could not, or at any 
rate did not, speak out. The government came out against the prize, denouncing the academy’s 
decision as political and branding the recipient as a French writer (October 13), thereby instilling 
doubts among many mainland readers, who lacked access to Gao’s most recent texts and in particular 
his two novels, as to whether he still wrote in Chinese. [3] However, Premier Zhu Rongji, in the course 
of a long press conference held during a visit to Japan on the evening of October 14, congratulated 
the laureate as well as the French Ministry for Culture, perhaps because he was not sufficiently 
informed of the line decided in Beijing, or because he personally disagreed with it. [4] Others, 
including critics Liu Zaifu and writer Mo Yan, congratulated Gao Xingjian, echoing the resounding 
endorsement of the prize in Hong Kong and especially Taiwan, where Gao Xingjian has now achieved 
cult-like status. 
More importantly, the prize reignited a century-old polemic on Chinese literature’s “special 
relationship” with the nation and its difficulty in attaining universal significance, well know to Western 
critics through the strongly worded views of C. T. Hsia. Hsia, whose History of Modern Chinese 
Fiction was first published in 1961, bluntly stated in his afterword to the third edition in 1999 that the 
“obsession with China” that in his view characterises modern Chinese literature allows it, at best, to 
share –“a spiritual affinity with the most significant modern Western literature, despite its explicit 
denial of universality.” [5] At the other end of the ideological spectrum, Fredric Jameson, after visiting 
Beijing in 1986, famously averred that because it always speaks for the oppressed national community 
as a whole, “the Third World novel will not offer the satisfactions of Proust or Joyce; what is more 
damaging than that perhaps, is its tendency to remind us of outmoded stages of our own first-world 
cultural development.” [6] Julia Lovell, the first Western scholar to devote a book-length study to 
“China’s quest for a Nobel Prize in literature,” similarly focuses on what she views as the Nobel 
committee’s hypocrisy in highlighting the “universal value” of Gao’s writings while in fact rewarding his 
stance as a “closet dissident” who, despite his ostensible stance as an apolitical writer of non-national 
literature, in fact remains “obsessed with China” (and therefore, no doubt, unworthy of the 
prize). [7] Regardless of how one judges the quality of Gao’s writing, or modern Chinese literature in 
general, one cannot help wondering if there is not an implicit misunderstanding in these 
pronouncements: the universal appeal of a literary work is surely not incompatible with an author’s 
deep engagement with one (or even possibly more than one) particular society or culture. In any 
case, it is safe to conclude that the 2000 Nobel Prize did not put an end to the polemics about the 
international position of Chinese literature, but only fanned them further, with Gao Xingjian’s name 
even being omitted from some lists of Nobel laureates in China. [8] 
More recently, one might add, discussion of the value of Chinese literature was rekindled by an 
interview with German sinologist Wolfgang Kubin for the Chinese-language service of German 
broadcaster Deutsche Welle in the fall of 2006, in which Kubin criticised – in no uncertain terms – 
excessive Western interest in contemporary Chinese fiction (in particular what he described as 
commercial fiction such as works by Wei Hui and Mian Mian), to the detriment of other genres such as 
contemporary poetry and Republican fiction. The huge impact that this rather brief interview with an 
obscure European public radio broadcaster sparked in China [9] once again revealed the importance, 
in the eyes of many Chinese intellectuals, of worldwide recognition for literature written in their 
language or their country. Incidentally, Kubin on this occasion dismissed a question about the value of 
Gao Xingjian’s writing as “a joke.” [10] Most recently, the 2009 Frankfurt Book Fair, at which “China” 
was invited as “guest of honour,” once more stoked passions when certain writers were not included in 
the official delegation. [11] 
While these discussions are revealing and stimulating, it seems important that academics take a non-
normative approach to literature, including to the texts themselves. Polemics such as those 
surrounding the Nobel Prize or W. Kubin’s views are reminiscent of a time in which the study of 
literature was devoted to demonstrating its “beauty,” and literature as a discipline was a branch of 
aesthetics rather than of social sciences. Much of the indignation about the Nobel Prize (awarded, no 
less, by a group of old, white, European males who purport to “judge” the merits of world literature) 
stems from excessive naivety as to the pureness of its ideals – it is after all, as Zhu Rongji slyly 
suggested, not different from other, often hotly disputed, literary prizes and their intrigues, including 
in China (the four-yearly Mao Dun prize probably tops the list). In these post-Bourdieusian, post-
Jaussian times, most scholars have come to work with a far more prosaic understanding of literary 
texts and their institutional status, which is not seen to be derived from visionary philosophical 
insights couched in aesthetically sublime forms by a prophet-like writer in the romantic tradition, but 
as a complex interaction between social expectations and representations, the cultural “field,” and its 
power plays. 
However, these debates have raised welcome questions about the self-representation of Chinese 
literature and its place in the world, in a context in which the relevance of literature itself to the 
contemporary world is constantly called into doubt. The outcry in China over the Nobel Prize, in strong 
contrast with Taiwan and Hong Kong speaks to the continued expectation in official circles that 
literature must be “representative” of the nation. In an interview conducted by Julia Lovell, Lao She’s 
son Shu Yi, then director of the National Literature Museum, exclaims: “Why don’t they give the Prize 
to China?,” [12] in a striking contrast with the Nobel committee’s own statements that prizes are 
purely individual, and even explicit desire to reward individuals somehow at odds with their 
nation. [13] 
Similarly, Wolfgang Kubin’s views are of interest not because they disqualify contemporary fiction, but 
because they raise certain substantive questions: in this respect the often sympathetic echo of Kubin’s 
views in the Chinese press can be seen as a manifestation of not only a secular inferiority complex, 
but also an ongoing concern among Chinese intellectuals about certain trends in contemporary society 
(including, but not limited to, China), such as commercialisation, intellectual parochialism, and 
reverence for officialdom and state-sanctioned culture. Kubin highlights the lack of “cosmopolitanism” 
among contemporary Chinese writers, contrasting them with their Republican-era predecessors, who 
often read news and fiction from around the world. [14] He finds fault with Chinese literature’s 
continued subordination to politics (after 1949) and now also to commercial success (since 1992): 
because of institutions such as the Writers’ Association (recently buttressed by a move to include 
young best-selling authors such as Guo Jingming [15]), no contemporary writer living in China has 
tackled issues such as Tibet or Tiananmen. Like more than a few Chinese writers, Kubin deplores the 
corruption of the Chinese language by bureaucratic Mao-speak, which he likens to German under the 
Third Reich (in an implicit reference to Victor Klemperer’s seminal study Lingua Tertii Imperii), a 
problem he believes is compounded by the lack of proper editorial work by Chinese publishers. He 
points to the contemporary novel and its continued emulation of “magic realism” by writers such as 
Mo Yan – a critique reminiscent of Ziauddin Sardar (Postmodernism and the other, 1998), who 
accuses the genre of repackaging exoticism for post-colonial readers – as a source of stagnation, in 
particular the systematic use of allegory to convey political messages, which he believes impedes 
literary innovation. [16] 
Therefore, while may seem paradoxical to focus on a writer as “marginal” as Gao Xingjian to reflect on 
the status of contemporary literature in China, the criticisms directed at him are part of the larger 
debate on Chinese literature. More importantly, ten years after the first Chinese-language Nobel Prize, 
the controversy shows no sign of abating, a fact that ultimately speaks to the continued importance of 
literature in the intellectual debate in China. 
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